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By Robin Barrow. Totowa,
New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books. 1982. Pp. xii, 204. $26.50.

INJUSTICE, INEQUALITY AND ETHICS.

For thousands of years, philosophers have searched for the magic
formula for a universally acceptable system of moral imperatives.
Nonetheless, the problem of practical ethics, which searches for answers to actual moral questions, continues to press. Joining current
debates, Robin Barrow's useful, if not unique,1 book tackles ten hard
fought questions of contemporary practical ethics with a hybrid
brand of utilitarian philosophy.
In Injustice, Inequality and Ethics, Barrow confronts a wide variety of moral questions ranging from abortion to democracy to vegetarianism. His prescriptions are these: Feminist language is not
imperative; sex-role stereotyping in child-rearing is legitimate; reverse-discrimination is unjustified; abortion may not pose any moral
problems, but, in any event, is a matter of individual choice; wealth
should be evenly distributed; democracy is the preferable form of
government; civil disobedience is defensible; humans may kill and
eat animals, but should not make them suffer; art as expression
should be subsidized, but, for the most part, not controlled by the
state; and education should impart the skills necessary for living
well.
Barrow calls himself a utilitarian, writing unabashedly that utilitarianism is "the only satisfactory moral theory" (p. 10, emphasis added). Surprisingly, then, he adopts a suspiciously non-utilitarian
formulation of utilitarianism, which he acknowledges that he owes
to John Rawls.2
1. See, e.g., P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979); TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1975).
2. P. 2(). Rawls' two principles of justice are:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
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Pure utilitarianism, as Barrow correctly explains, is a "consequentialist" or result-sensitive ethical theory (p. 14). Traditionally,
the utilitarians' goal is to provide the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people.3 Utilitarianism thus differs from ethical
theories based on the writings of Immanuel Kant,4 whose views influenced Rawls. 5 Kantian theories search for the logical underpinnings of morality, preliminary to spinning out specific prescriptions.
For example, according to Kant, inherent in moral discourse is the
notion that moral imperatives can be universalized. Kantian theories, because they depend on the formal characteristics of ethical discourse, resist the pressure of result orientation. Thus, such theories
do not depend on the amount of happiness produced.
Barrow's Rawlsian-sounding statement of utilitarianism forsakes
a pure utilitarian focus on the production of human happiness. Happiness for the greatest number remains the goal, but with the qualification that "no policy is adopted that either ignores the claim to
happiness of any individual or would make some happier at the expense of others" (p. 20). This hybrid utilitarianism reaches beyond
the foundation of utilitarian theory and, in some circumstances,
makes consequences irrelevant. Thus, Barrow implies that we cannot
ignore or undervalue the interests of any human being even if to do
so would produce the greatest good.
Barrow's position is an attractive one. Such hybrid utilitarianism
keeps the intuitively appealing focus on happiness and avoids
utilitarian excesses illustrated by the scapegoat problem: Suppose
that a citizenry terrorized by an atrocious crime can only be pacified
(producing the greatest happiness) if someone is executed. When the
true criminal cannot be found, an innocent person is selected, advertised as the offender, and killed. The result redounds to the greater
good and is therefore consistent with pure utilitarian principles. The
need to avoid the scapegoat problem has pushed Barrow to Kant
and Rawls, but he offers no justification for his position other than
its value in short-circuiting objections to utilitarianism.6
Hybrid theories combining aspects of Kantian and utilitarian
moral reasoning are not novel. R.M. Hare recently stated that moral
reasoning includes a logical component - its tenets can be universalized - and a substantial aspect consisting of human preference.7
3. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (0. Piest ed. 1953).
4. See I. KANT, THE MORAL LAW (H. Paten trans. ed. 1956).
5. See J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at viii (1971); P. SINGER, supra note 1, at 11.
6. A utilitarian ground for such a rule is conceivable. It would depend on a judgment that
no policy which ignores the rights of individuals will ever promote the greatest good. That,
however, is not an argument Barrow makes, although he does adopt rule utilitarianism, instead of its rival, act utilitarianism. See pp. 14-16.
7. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 4 (1981) (reviewed in this issue).
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Barrow seems to adopt this interesting method, but it is a fault and a
disappointment of his work that he does not explore it.
In the balance of the book, Barrow applies his framework to
resolving a mix of ethical questions. "Animals," because its subject
· is less familiar than the others he discusses, is one of the more interesting chapters. Barrow is not the first to assert that humanity's persistent failure to include animals in the measure of the greatest good
is simple prejudice, that "speciesism" 8 is no more defensible than
racism (pp. 158-59). This is so, he thinks, because beings are morally
significant if they have interests and the capacity to suffer. Animals
can have both (p. 160).9 Because all suffering is bad, human beings
behave immorally when they cause animals to &,uffer (p. 160). Barrow resists the logical conclusion that killing animals is wrong, asserting that killing animals does not necessarily cause physical
suffering, nor, as with humans, the equally painful fear of death (pp.
165-66). We may still eat steak, if we kill it kindly.Io
The disturbing result of Barrow's view is that it deemphasizes the
value of life. He resists placing a positive value on life itself because
this approach might force the further conclusion that, in some circumstances, human beings have a duty to procreate (p. 165). 11 But
whatever logical problems it may cause, one would be hard pressed
to think of a proposition more universally held than that life is
desirable.
It is worth noting that Barrow's point that animals do not anticipate and therefore do not suffer from the fear of death may apply
equally to incapacitated humans. I2 It is aL50 uncertain that animals
suffer less from dying than do humans. Humans' painful anticipation and fear of death may be equalled by animals' painful lack of
understanding of their circumstances. I3
Barrow is most uncertain in the chapter called "Abortion." His
"weak thesis" argues that abortion is morally justifiable, but permitted only in "certain fairly limited circumstances" (pp. 104-05). Such
circumstances would exist when providing sustenance to the fetus
would itself cause great suffering (p. 102). Barrow, however, fails to
8. See Singer, All Animals are Equal, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 103, 108, 116 n.5
(1974) (attributing the term "speciesism" to Dr. Richard Ryder).
9. Barrow concedes that some animals may have neither interests nor a capacity for suffering. He suggests, however, that the line defining beings fit for moral concern should lie between higher and lower forms of life rather than between humans and animals, Pp. 160-61.
10. Barrow would probably resist this characterization. Although he says that "perhaps, in
certain circumstances, it is justifiable to kill animals in order to eat them," he does not claim
that this is necessarily so. P. 166.
11. "I regard the essence of utilitarianism as being a moral requirement that we ensure as
much happiness for all existing beings as possible, rather than that we should create as many
happy beings as possible." P. 165.
12. P. SINGER, supra note 1, at 75.
13. Id at 53.
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define the specific circumstances in which the mother's suffering
would justify killing 14 the fetus, and thus sidesteps the thorniest issues in the abortion debate. Barrow concludes that "the complexity
and uncertainty surrounding this issue" means the individual rather
than the state must determine the proper course (p. 105).
The weak thesis is based on the well-worn analogy of the relationship of mother and fetus: It is as if the mother "wakes to consciousness one day to discover that a famous violinist has been
plugged into her, in order that he may partake of such organs as her
liver and heart . . . ." 15 This analogy, once accepted (and it need
not be accepted since pregnancy, at least in some cases, is not entirely unforeseen), is employed to argue that a mother's rights may
allow her to choose to deny the fetus sustenance (p. 101). But, for
utilitarians, rights only arise when they tend to produce the greatest
good (p. 101). So, the utilitarian must ask whether the decision to
end a dependent life serves the greatest good. Barrow terms this the
weak thesis, since it is uncertain that utility will so consistently favor
the mother's freedom to choose as to create a right to choose. One
interesting point made in the course of this discussion is that deciding whether a fetus is a person does not resolve the abortion dilemma, since we do, in some circumstances, allow the killing of
persons (p. 93).
The "strong thesis" is actually the weaker of the two. Again, Barrow relies on the notion that what is bad is suffering. Killing a fetus
does not cause the fetus to suffer, because a fetus does not have the
self-awareness required for suffering (pp. 102-03). Therefore, abortion escapes the realm of moral discourse entirely (p. 102). The conclusion that abortion is not a moral issue because the fetus does not
suffer disregards the powerful notion that life is valuable, and is so
preposterous that it completely discredits Barrow's premise that suffering is the key factor in the moral calculus.
Barrow's discussion of feminist language in the chapter, "Feminism: Language and Thought," is unconvincing because he considers and refutes only one of the arguments in its favor. To Barrow,
the only issue is whether the speaker is thinking sexist thoughts and
thus using sexist language to maintain the advantaged status of the
male. If a speaker does not hold sexist views, then sexually stereotypical language is acceptable. The point is fair, but inconclusive,
for Barrow ignores other arguments for using gender-neutral
language.
14. According to Barrow, "A primary question must be 'can killing ever be justified?', for
whatever the exact status of the foetus, it seems certain that destroying it or removing it from
the womb would amount to killing it." P. 93.
15. P. 101. This analogy originated in Thompson, A .Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB.
AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971).
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Two examples from the book amply illustrate the thinness of
Barrow's understanding. Homosexual men, he says, may be called
"homosexuals," "queers," "pansies," "fairies," "faggots" or "gays."
But, ''you cannot be sure about a particular person's attitude to homosexuality simply by knowing which term he prefers to use to refer
to them" (p. 59). (The listener may not feel the need to be sure.)
Similarly, there may be nothing wrong with calling a black man
"boy" because the word does not necessarily indicate a paternalistic
attitude (p. 61 ). One significant problem is that Barrow lightly dismisses the fact that regardless of the speaker's attitude, certain terms
may be highly offensive to the listener. Moreover, he discredits the
educational value of feminist language.
Although we must continue to await the definitive resolution of
moral questions, Barrow's book is still helpful. Like other similar
works, it sparks moral self-examination. It is, however, marred by
some unfortunate misjudgments. One lapse is temperament: The
book's tone is arrogant to the point of being insulting. Second, the
author's evident prejudices have made the book less than thorough.
For example, Barrow ignores the impact of sexist la~guage on the
listener. Priorities were also miscalculated, so that some difficult arguments are slipshod or absent and other more obvious ones are
overworked. One wonders, for example, how any author could
devote equal space to the intuitive point that animals feel pain and
the less evident notion that democracy is the best form of government. Finally, Barrow's methodological approach is confused.
Throughout the book the Kantian-utilitarian tension· is unresolved.
With other excellent works on contemporary ethics available, Barrow's book is not the first that should be taken from the shelf.

